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Abstract 
Effort and reward jointly shape many human decisions. Errors in predicting the required 
effort needed for a task can lead to suboptimal behavior. Here, we show that effort 
estimations can be biased when retrospectively re-estimated following receipt of a rewarding 
outcome. These biases depend on the contingency between reward and task difficulty, and 
are stronger for highly contingent rewards. Strikingly the observed pattern accords with 
predictions from Bayesian cue integration, indicating humans deploy an adaptive and 
rational strategy to deal with inconsistencies between the efforts they expend and the 
ensuing rewards.  
Significance Statement 
Retrospective re-evaluation of effort is a pervasive aspect of everyday life, such as when we 
assess our professional satisfaction after knowing the ensuing outcomes. Previous studies 
have focused on the interaction of effort and reward when a choice is to be made, while 
retrospective interactions have been largely ignored. Here we show that humans revise their 
estimation of effort after receiving a reward.  When rewarded more than average, subjects 
tend to overestimate their effort, with a converse effect observed for low rewards. The size of 
this bias depends strongly on the contingency between reward magnitude and task difficulty 
and is dynamically adjusted when changes occur in these contingencies. These results 
reveal a sophisticated mechanism to cope with reward-effort inconsistencies.   
"Aye, and I saw Sisyphus in violent torment, seeking to raise a monstrous stone with both his hands." 
Homer, Book XI of the Odyssey 
 
The adage “it was well worth the effort” highlights an assumed interdependency between 
attainment of reward and retrospective effort assignment. Despite its ubiquity we know little 
about the nature of these retrospective effort estimations. Previous studies have focused on 
the interaction of effort and reward as costs and benefits when a choice is to be made (1-5). 
Whether receipt of reward influences a retrospective estimation of effort is not known. 
Intuitively, we assume to have immediate and unbiased access to internal representations of 
how much “effort” we expended in an endeavor. Here, we demonstrate that retrospective 
estimation of effort is strongly affected by the amount of monetary reward attained and, as 
such, is profoundly biased. This bias adheres to established principles of Bayesian cue 
integration (6-8) and, on this basis, is not irrational.  
In a behavioral experiment, participants pressed two buttons on a keyboard to push a ball up 
a virtual ramp, and rated their experienced physical effort in each trial (Fig.1, see also the SI 
Text for additional information regarding the task). The ball rolled back by a constant amount 
on each frame of the display, hence simulating a gravity force that varied so as to 
manipulate task difficulty (N=6 difficulty levels, adjusted individually for each participant). 
Successful trials where participants managed to push the ball all the way up the ramp were 
rewarded. Reward was contingent upon task difficulty (with values drawn from 6 Gaussian 
distributions with Means from 1.5-6.5 cents) and the strength of this contingency varied 
across different blocks of the experiment (Standard deviations (SD) of 1.2 or 2.5 cents). 
Additionally, we included a control experiment in which reward receipt was unrelated to task 
difficulty (SD=∞).  
The reward information was presented either before or after the rating of effort (in 90% and 
10% of trials, respectively). Trials in which reward was shown after the estimation of effort 
served as a reference, since here subjects are not influenced by preceding reward 
information. Participants were instructed to pay attention to all information presented in a trial 
including a brief color change of the ball (50% of the trials) which they needed to detect on 
each trial. This manipulation was implemented to distract subjects from the true purpose of 
experiment; discouraging ad hoc strategies that might link effort and reward (also see SI 
Text). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Participants were asked to move a ball up a ramp by engaging in fast, alternating key presses. 
A gravity force was simulated, displacing the ball backwards by a constant amount on each display 
frame. We used six levels of task difficulty, corresponding to the amount of ball displacement per time 
frame. After the ball was successfully pushed all the way to the top of the ramp, participants received 
a monetary reward, where reward amount was contingent upon task difficulty. The strength of this 
contingency was varied in two separate blocks. Reward receipt information was either displayed 
before (90%) or after the rating of effort (10% of trials, not shown here). Subjects rated their effort by 
shifting the position of a sliding bar. At the end of each trial, they were asked to indicate if they had 
seen a color change in the ball. All intervals in a trial were self-paced except for outcome reward 
display (2-3s). 
In trials where reward information was presented before effort rating, we examined if reward 
magnitude influenced the effort estimation (Fig.2). We measured the regression slope 
between trial-by-trial variations in reward (Ri−µr, with Ri being the reward on each trial in 
cents and µr being the mean reward of each difficulty level) and estimated effort (Ei − µe, with 
Ei being the estimated effort on each trial and µe being the mean estimated effort of each 
difficulty level, see also Fig. S1). In both blocks with different reward contingencies (red vs. 
blue bars in Fig.2), there was a significant relationship between reward variation and 
estimated effort (Wilcoxon Sign Rank test, P=0.00094 for SD=1.2 cents and P=0.002 for 
SD=2.5 cents). This effect of reward on estimated effort was stronger when reward variance 
was smaller, i.e. when reward was highly contingent upon the task difficulty (mean slopes of 
0.012 and 0.005 for SD=1.2 and SD=2.5 cents, respectively; Wilcoxon Sign Rank test for the 
difference of both slopes, P=0.004). This result was highly consistent across subjects 
(Fig.S2). We observed the same pattern of results when reward magnitude was balanced 
across blocks using a stratification method (Fig.S3). In a control experiment, where reward 
was randomly varied and unrelated to the task difficulty (SD=∞), regression slopes did not 
differ from zero (Wilcoxon Sign Rank test, P=0.15, for individual data see Fig.S4). These 
results indicate that reward influences effort estimation only when there is a reliable 
relationship with task difficulty, and hence a reliable relationship with the true exertion level 
subjects expend while pushing the ball. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2. (A) Relationship between trial-by-trial fluctuations in reward and retrospective estimates of 
expended effort in a typical subject tested with high (SD=1.2 cents, data shown in red) and low 
(SD=2.5 cents, data shown in blue) reward contingencies. The estimated effort Ei is normalized to 
each subject’s maximum estimated effort in the whole experiment, and the mean effort µi of each 
difficulty level is subtracted. The same procedure is implemented in relation to rewards Ri and their 
means µr. The slope β of the linear regression is larger for the higher reward contingency. In a control 
experiment, we tested if random variations of reward (SD=∞, data shown in black) impact on 
estimates of effort. Here, slopes did not significantly differ from zero (P=0.15; Wilcoxon Sign rank test.) 
(B) Regression slopes of all individual subjects in both experiments (colors as in A). Average slopes 
differ from zero only when reward is contingent on task difficulty (P-levels from Wilcoxon Sign rank 
test). (C) Average regression slopes across subjects are higher when reward is more contingent on 
task difficulty than when less contingent (P=0.004, Wilcoxon Sign rank test). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
Regression results are based on a robust regression analysis (“robustfit” in MATLAB with default 
settings) that minimizes the effect of potential outliers.  
 
We next compared our behavioral data to predictions arising out of five separate 
computational models (Fig. 3). At the time when participants estimate their effort, the 
requirement was to retrospectively recall their true effort level. This recalled effort, Em (gray 
distribution in Fig.3A), is predictive of the true effort but is corrupted by noise, as reflected in 
the variance 𝜎m2. When reward is correlated with task difficulty, reward magnitude yields by 
itself an independent effort estimation Er with uncertainty 𝜎r2 (red distribution in Fig.3A). In 
each trial, Er and Em can differ by a certain amount (ΔE≠0). The models we consider are 
based on distinct ways how a conflict between these two informational sources (Er and Em) 
might be resolved.  
In all models, Em is computed based on the trials where reward was presented after the 
estimation of effort, i.e. where the estimation of effort is unaffected by reward information. Er 
is computed based on the posterior probability distribution of task difficulty given an obtained 
reward (for details see SI Text). Model 1 (Memory Only) assumes that participants solely rely 
on the recalled effort (Em) and completely ignore reward information. Hence, the effort 
estimate ?̂?  is equal to Em multiplied by a scaling factor km: 
(1)?̂? = 𝐸m ∗ 𝑘m  
By contrast, model 2 (Reward Only) relies completely on reward information, while 
the recalled effort (Em) is disregarded: 
(2)  ?̂? = 𝐸r ∗ 𝑘r   
Model 3 assumes that both Em and Er contribute to effort estimation with ?̂? being a 
weighted average (WA) of Em and Er: 
(3) ?̂? = 𝜔 ∗ 𝐸m + (1 − 𝜔) ∗ 𝐸r  
Models 1-3 all assume that information regarding each signal’s variance is not explicitly 
exploited by the participants. On the other hand, model 4 (Bayes Optimal) assumes that a 
Bayesian optimal strategy is used by the participants where signals are weighted based on 
their respective reliability or inverse variance: 
(4)   ?̂? = 𝜔m ∗ 𝐸m + 𝜔r ∗ 𝐸r , 
where 𝜔m = 1 − 𝜔r and 𝜔r =  
1
𝜎r2
1
𝜎m2
+
1
𝜎r2
 . 
Similar reliability-based Bayesian models have been used previously to explain integration of 
sensory cues during perceptual decision making (6-8). The variances 𝜎m2 and 𝜎r2  are 
derived from the data and reward probability distributions. It is however debatable if 𝜎m2 is 
indeed inferred correctly using the trials where reward was presented after the rating of effort. 
Instead, the true variance 𝜎m2 might be a multiple of the variance in these trials. Therefore, 
model 5 (Adapted Bayes Optimal) is a modified version of model 4, assuming that the 
variance of 𝐸m (𝜎m2) is scaled by a free parameter k (𝜎m̂
2 =  𝜎m2 ∗ 𝑘). 
(5)   ?̂? =
1
𝜎r2
1
𝑘𝜎m
2 +
1
𝜎r2
∗ 𝐸m + (1 −
1
𝜎r2
1
𝑘𝜎m
2 +
1
𝜎r2
) ∗ 𝐸r  
We evaluated these models by computing their Maximum Likelihood fits to the trial-by-trial 
data of individual subjects, measuring the quality of fits by Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC, see methods). BIC weights shown in Fig. 3B are the weight of evidence in favor of 
each model (9, 10). The average BIC weights are highest for the Bayesian weighted 
averaging model (for data of individual subjects see SI Text). Importantly, in most subjects 
the model that merely relied on the memorized effort alone (without assuming any reward 
influence) performed considerably worse in terms of explaining the data (see the Table S2). 
Model 4 (BO) also holds that the ratio of weights 𝜔m/𝜔r derived from the data in one block 
should be predictive of the ratio of weights in the other block respectively, given the known 
variances 𝜎r2 of the reward signal in each block, and assuming the uncertainty of memory 𝜎m 
to be constant (see also Suppl. Info). Fig. 3C shows that this prediction provides a good 
match to the data (P>0.5, Wilcoxon Sign Rank, for comparison of observed and predicted 
𝜔m/𝜔r). The reliance of participants on the reward signal can thus be accurately predicted 
by its variance. Finally, the variance of joint estimates was on average smaller than the 
variance of each signal alone, supporting that the Bayes optimal strategy participants use for 
signal integration improves their general accuracy in effort estimation (see Fig.S5).  
 
 
Fig. 3. (A) Two types of information can be combined to derive the estimated effort (Ê): Em is the 
recalled effort which is distorted by memory noise (σm); Er is the most likely effort level given the 
reward magnitude in each trial, its variability σr being dependent on the contingency of reward and 
task difficulty. According to Bayes optimal models, the influence of each signal on Ê depends on its 
reliability. In blocks with low contingency, σr is large, and Er, has a weaker influence on the estimate Ê, 
while for high reward contingency, Ê is closer to Er (upper and lower panel, respectively). In each trial, 
Em and Er differ by a certain amount ΔE (ΔE≠0).  (B) Model comparison: BIC weights indicate the 
weight of evidence in favor of each model. (C) Using the weight ratio ωm ∕ ωr derived from the data in 
one block and the known reward variability σr of both blocks, the weight ratio ωm ∕ ωr in the other block 
can be accurately predicted (see also SI).  
In this study, we show that after receiving reward information, humans revise their estimation 
of effort required for its attainment. The strength of correlation between task difficulty and 
obtained reward had a profound influence on retrospective effort estimates. Importantly, 
participants were adept at adjusting their estimation of effort when reward contingencies 
changed within the same experimental session.  
We note that in our experiments, more difficult trials required larger number of key presses 
and therefore took more time to complete than was the case for easy trials, entailing a 
decreased reward density per unit time. Therefore, participants’ estimation of their effort 
might also be influenced by their estimation of trial time or perceived reward density. While 
we cannot rule out a contribution from this factor, we would suggest that a dependency on 
time might be an inherent feature of effort estimations, since highly demanding tasks usually 
entail longer realization times. 
How do these findings extend to real life situations? In many instances, the effort we expend 
is closely tethered to consequential outcomes. For example, in the context of performance-
based pay employees are remunerated in proportion to the degree to which a task is 
accomplished (11-13). Accordingly, there is a strong prior in many societies that rewards 
(wages) are contingent upon effort (labor invested). Equally, in fields such as sport (14, 15) 
and education (16-18), there is a common belief in a contingency between effort and 
success. In our study we show that such a prior is deployed by humans when they 
retrospectively evaluate effort. However, a direct comparison of the impact of real life 
contingencies and the contingencies used in our paradigm is still missing. Moreover, in our 
task design and description participants may have paid more attention to reward, and the 
information conveyed by it, than is the case in real life. Future studies are needed to reveal 
whether, and to what extent, our findings generalize to other situations including real-life 
scenarios. 
A question arises as to whether a flexible estimation of past effort serves a functional role. 
We suggest that rethinking one’s efforts after receiving rewards constitutes a metacognitive 
ability(19) to negotiate uncertainties in effort-reward relationships. In everyday life, rewards 
are usually correlated with effort, but the strength of this correlation may change. The here 
reported acute adjustment of effort estimation can greatly aid goal-directed behavior when 
decisions are based on online monitoring of environmental factors. Indeed, failure of such 
mechanisms might lead to occupational disorders such as burn-out syndrome that are 
thought to be related to perception of an effort-reward imbalance (20, 21). 
The distorted effort rating observed in the current study also bears resemblance to hindsight 
bias (22), reflecting a tendency to change recalled probability estimations once outcomes 
are known. As in a hindsight bias, retrospective change in effort estimation might reflect a 
general tendency to reshape memory contents in order to make them fit with an updated 
knowledge base (23). A large number of other cognitive biases have been described in the 
past which also reflect human's deviation from rationality (24). Similarly, perceptual 
decisions are prone to deviate from the veridical as seen in phenomena such as sensory 
illusions (7, 25). Recent theoretical work has suggested that these "biases" reflect humans’ 
ability to deal with the uncertainties in the world using the probabilistic structure of the 
environment (26, 27). Therefore seemingly erroneous judgments are not only very common 
in the course of evolution (28) but are also optimal and rational (29-31). The finding that the 
impact of rewards on retrospectively evaluated effort conforms to a Bayesian rule of cue 
integration is in line with these previous studies, extending them to a domain with relevance 
to most aspects of our daily life. 
We have shown that human subjects either under- or over-estimate their past effort when 
rewards are smaller or larger than average, respectively. Whether a similar tendency 
influences normative beliefs, for example regarding the distribution of wealth in society, is a 
potentially important avenue of further investigation. For example, individuals with higher 
incomes who are exposed to greater than average rewards might have an inflated 
perception of the effort they expended to acquire their wealth. Conversely, those with low-
income might have the opposite perception. One might also speculate that such a biased 
perception of effort could contribute to stabilizing inequality. Indeed, the increasing equality 
gaps in many societies reinforce the importance of gaining insight into the complex interplay 
between retrospective assignments and the emergence of socio-economic norms.  
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Supporting Text 
 
Participants. 26 participants (15 females, age: 20-39, mean: 27.07±5.1) took part in 
our main experiment. Two participants were excluded from the analysis since in our 
debriefing they mentioned they had not paid attention to the reward magnitudes during the 
experiment. 14 participants (9 females, age: 21-35, mean: 27.5±4.1) participated in the 
control experiment. Participants gave oral and written consent for their attendance. The 
study was approved by the local ethics committee of Berlin Charité University Hospital. 
 
Stimuli and task.  Stimuli were produced with MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox (1, 
2). Each trial consisted of a stimulus (ball and ramp), a reward and an effort rating display all 
shown on a black background (see Fig.1). The stimulus display contained the ball (radius: 3 
visual degrees), initially at the starting part of the ramp (ramp length: 19 visual degrees; both 
ball and ramp had a light gray color). The ball was displaced up the ramp with consecutive 
alternate key presses (left and right arrow keys) until it reached the upper plateau. Each key 
press resulted in a constant amount of displacement (0.87 visual degrees per key press) and 
was counteracted by a gravity force of variable strength that displaced the ball backwards. 
To determine the levels of gravity force, at the beginning of the experiment we asked each 
subject to push the ball up the ramp by pressing both keys alternately and consecutively as 
fast as they possibly could. 90% of the gravity force necessary to counteract the maximum 
number of key presses in a limited time (10s) determined the maximum gravity force used in 
the experiment. Based on this individualized estimate, 6 equally spaced gravity levels were 
defined and used in the experiment. A trial was aborted if key presses did not occur fast 
enough (max pause allowed: 2s). If participants were able to successfully push the ball all 
the way up, they received a monetary reward, with the amount contingent on task difficulty 
(gravity force level). Reward magnitude was defined based on 6 Gaussians with means of 
1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 5.5 and 6.5 cents, using two different standard deviations (SD of 1.2 or 2.5 
cents) which determined the contingency between reward magnitude and task difficulty. 
Reward display consisted of a pie chart that depicted subjects’ reward as a proportion of 
maximum reward possible and a number which showed the reward in Arabic numerals. 
Effort rating display consisted of a slider, and participants were instructed to set the slider at 
a position which represents their experienced effort during a trial proportionate to the 
maximum effort they had ever experienced during the experiment. In 90% of trials, the 
reward display was shown immediately after the stimulus display, while in 10% of trials it 
occurred after the rating of effort. 
The main experiment was done in two separate blocks in which different reward 
contingencies (SD of 1.2 or 2.5 cents) were used. Participants did not receive any instruction 
regarding the strength of contingency between task difficulty and reward, and were only told 
that a change in the strength of this relationship would occur across blocks. The order of 
these blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. Due to the random assignment of this 
order (i.e. whether the contingency of the first block was high or low), the direction of change 
across blocks (from weak to strong or vice versa) was also unknown to the experimenters. 
Therefore, participants had to experience the relationship between task difficulties and 
reward by themselves, in the absence of any prior knowledge regarding the strength of any 
contingencies. Subjects first performed 12 training trials before the start of each block so that 
they were acquainted with the task and the reward-effort relationship. These trials were not 
included in our analyses. Each block consisted of 6 smaller mini-blocks, each consisting of 
36 trials. Participants could take a pause and rest between the mini-blocks. In the control 
experiment, rewards were randomly chosen and varied between 0.5 and 5 cents, without 
any relationship to the difficulty levels.   
In pilot experiments, some participants reported that in order to work out a relationship 
between task difficulty and reward they had adopted different ad-hoc strategies. Since task 
difficulty and reward were the only parameters that varied across trials, participants had 
presumably focused exclusively on relating the two. In the main experiment, to distract 
subjects from its true purpose we introduced a second task into the main paradigm. Thus, 
subjects were also asked to report if they had seen a brief (21ms or 3 frames) color change 
on the ball (to green, red or blue) at the end of each trial, which occurred in 50% of the trials. 
We debriefed the participants after the experiments and note that none reported that the 
main question of the study involved effort and reward relationships, nor did they now report 
using ad-hoc strategies. 
Computational modeling. Our models are based on two independent effort estimates: An 
estimate purely based on the subjective memory of the effort spent in a trial (Em), which is 
unaffected by reward information, and an estimate purely based on the information 
conveyed by reward magnitude (Er). 
 Em was derived from a Gaussian distribution with mean 𝜇m and variance 𝜎m2, which were 
computed based on the trials in which estimation of effort was unaffected by reward (i.e. 
where effort was rated after receiving reward). Effort estimates of these unbiased trials will 
be referred to as Eu. The average 𝜇m at a difficulty level di was calculated as the median of a 
participant’s rated efforts Eu in that difficulty level. The variance 𝜎m2  across trials t was 
calculated as: 
(1) 𝜎m2 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝐸𝑢𝑡 − 𝜇𝑚)
2𝑛
𝑡=1  
To estimate Em in a given trial, a random value was then drawn from a Gaussian distribution 
with mean 𝜇mand variance 𝜎m2. 
Er is the most likely effort level given a certain reward. It was derived from a Gaussian 
distribution with mean 𝜇r  and variance 𝜎r2 . To infer 𝜇r , we computed the most probable 
difficulty level ?̂? from all levels di, given a reward r, which can be obtained maximizing the 
posterior probability function 
(2) P(di |r) = P(r| di) * P(di)/P(r), 
where P(di) and P(r) are the probability of each difficulty level and each reward magnitude, 
respectively, and P(r| di) is the probability of a given reward at each difficulty level. The 
average estimate 𝜇r of all trials with a given ?̂? was computed as the median of estimated 
efforts Eu at that difficulty level. The variance 𝜎r2across all trials t was approximated as: 
(3) 𝜎r2 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝜇r − 𝜇m)2
𝑛
𝑡=1  
 To estimate Er in a given trial, a random value was then drawn from a Gaussian 
distribution with mean 𝜇r and variance 𝜎r2.  
In model 4 (BO), for each block, the corresponding 𝜎r2 was used; 𝜎m2 was assumed 
to remain unchanged across blocks. Model 5 (aBO) challenges the assumption that the 
variance 𝜎m2  is correctly reflected in the trials where participants rate their effort before 
receiving reward: The variance in these trials is influenced by motor noise, which might not 
be incorporated in σm. Moreover, at the time when subjects retrospectively evaluate their 
effort, the variance of their estimates might be affected by unknown factors (such as 
increased memory noise). Therefore, in model aBO, a free parameter (k) is used to scale 
𝜎𝑚
2. All other aspects of model 5 remained the same as in model 4. In all models, we only 
included trials with a conflict between Em and Er, i.e. where the estimate of task difficulty ?̂? 
provided by reward differed from the actual difficulty level. All trials of the two blocks (reward 
SD of 1.2 and 2.5) were modeled at once. 
Model Comparison.  Model one, two, three and five each had 1 free parameter: km, 
kr, ω and k respectively. Model 4 (BO) had no free parameter. The fit of each model (n=5) to 
the data was evaluated by computing log-likelihood and BIC: 
(4) 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2𝐿𝐿 + ln(𝑛) ∗ 𝑚  
 where LL is the model log-likelihood, and m is the number of free parameters. The individual 
BIC values contain arbitrary constants and are very much affected by sample size. We 
therefore rescaled BIC to obtain ∆BICs (3, 4), where:           
(5)  ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶 =  𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖 − 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 
and BICmin is the minimum of the N different BICi values. This transformation forces the best 
model to have ∆BIC = 0, while the rest of the models have positive values. The Bayesian 
weights are then derived from ∆BIC:  
(6)   𝜔𝑖 =  
exp (−0.5∆𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖)
∑ (−0.5∆𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛−1
   
The Bayesian weights (ωi) of all the models in a set sum up to 1 and indicate the probability 
for each model to be the best model for the data. 
Prediction of Bayesian weights using reward contingencies 
When the memory signal Em and the reward signal Er yield different effort estimates (ΔE≠0), 
participants integrate both signals into an estimate Ê, using the weights ωm and ωr, 
respectively. The ratio of these weights can be directly derived from the data (see also Fig. 
3A):  
(7) 
𝜔𝑟
𝜔𝑚
=
|Ê−𝐸𝑚| ∆𝐸
|Ê−𝐸𝑟| ∆𝐸
                  
Model 4 also holds that the weights of the reward and memory signal are inversely 
proportional to their relative variance: 
(8)   
𝜔𝑟
𝜔𝑚
=
𝜎𝑚
2
𝜎𝑟2
 
Assuming that the memory variance 𝜎𝑚
2 remains the same in the two blocks with different 
reward contingencies, we can compute the variances 𝜎𝑟1
2 and 𝜎𝑟2
2 as: 
 𝜎𝑟1
2 ∗
𝜔𝑟1
𝜔𝑚1
=   𝜎𝑟2
2 ∗
𝜔𝑟2
𝜔𝑚2
 
, 
(9) 
𝜔𝑟1
𝜔𝑚1
=   
𝜎𝑟1
2
𝜎𝑟22
∗
𝜔𝑟2
𝜔𝑚2
 . 
The variances 𝜎𝑟1
2 and 𝜎𝑟2
2 can be inferred from the known contingencies between reward 
and task difficulty (eq. 2). Thus, eq. 9 involves a direct prediction of the ratio of weights in 
one block from the ratio of weights in the other block. 
 
Reference List 
 
 1.  Brainard, D. H. (1997) The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spat. Vis. 10, 433-436. 
 2.  Pelli, D. G. (1997) The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming 
numbers into movies. Spat. Vis. 10, 437-442. 
 3.  Burnham K.P. & Anderson D.R. (2004) Multimodel Inference: Understanding AIC and 
BIC in Model Selection. Sociological Methods Research 33, 261-304. 
 4.  Wagenmakers, E. J. & Farrell, S. (2004) AIC model selection using Akaike weights. 
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 11, 192-196. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S1. Mean effort (µi) for each of the six difficulty levels i. µi increases monotonically with 
task difficulty. In our analysis, to assess the effect of reward independently of task difficulty, 
µi is subtracted from participants’ rated efforts (see also Fig. 2A). The resulting effort 
fluctuations (Ei - µi) are therefore only influenced by variations of reward (also see Figure 2 
and Supplementary Figure 3).  
 Fig. S2. Correlation between variations in rewards and estimated effort in individual subjects. 
Data in red corresponds to the block with stronger contingency between reward and task 
difficulty (SD=1.2), while data in blue corresponds to the block with a weaker contingency 
(SD=2.5)   
 Fig. S3. Regression slopes of individual subjects (A) and average regression slopes (B) for 
stratified data (colors as in Fig 2). Difference in contingency between reward and task 
difficulty entailed that reward spread could differ across blocks (compare reward spreads in 
Fig. 2A), which might in turn affect regression slopes. We therefore used a stratification 
method to balance reward magnitudes across blocks, and checked if the observed slope 
differences do still uphold. Stratification was done by defining 6 equally spaced bins between 
minimum and maximum reward (Ri - µr). We randomly removed surplus trials until trial 
number was the same for the two blocks in every bin. We recomputed the regression slopes 
for the stratified data. As shown in this figure, all our results did also hold for the stratified 
data (see also Figure 2B and 2C). In all our regression analyses (in the main text as well as 
in Supplementary Material), we used a robust regression analysis (‘robustfit’ in MATLAB with 
the default bisquare weighing function). This was done to minimize the contribution of 
potential outliers on the regression slopes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S4.  Rewards that are not contingent on task difficulty (SD= ∞) have no effect on 
estimated effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S5.  A) Estimated effort (?̂?), shown in magenta is computed based on Em (shown in 
gray) and Er (shown in red). Each of these estimates has its corresponding uncertainty 
reflected in the standard deviation of the distribution (σe, σm and σr, respectively). Bayesian 
optimal integration predicts σe to be smaller than both σm and σr. B) Standard deviations σe, 
σm and σr, averaged across all subjects and both reward contingency blocks. σe is smaller 
than σm (p=0.003) and σr (p=0.01, Wilcoxon Sign rank test). 
 
 
 
